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Abstract 
Breton and Wintrobe (1982) develop a non-traditional (modern) model of bureaucratic management that is based on 
the notion of “vertical trust” – the notion that subordinates “trade services” that advance the goals of the bureau''s 
leadership in return for various “informal payments,” none of which are codified in formal contracts between the two 
sets of parties. Applying the model to the Nazi bureaucracy explains how Nazi functionaries, such as Adolf Eichmann, 
acted as bureaucratic entrepreneurs in accomplishing goals relating to “the Jewish question,” and ultimately “the Final 
Solution,” for their superiors, such as Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986). As an 
extension of prior research, the current study examines the hypothesis that the use these vertical trust relationships 
within the borders of their minor Axis partners (e.g., Hungary) worked more effectively for the Germans than 
coercion, which would have been required to a greater degree within the borders of occupied European countries (e.g., 
Holland). Specifically, our estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, owing to their use of vertical trust networks the 
minor Axis countries each contributed about 152,000 more European Jews to the Nazi Holocaust apparatus than their 
German-occupied European country counterparts, wherein the Nazis relied more heavily on coercion.
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     1. Introduction and Background 
There is little argument with characterizing the German Nazi governmental apparatus’ effort, 
during the midst of prosecuting a two-front war, to systematically murder six million people 
in a few years time (i.e., mainly between 1941-1945) with the term “terrible efficiency.”  
According to Breton and Wintrobe (1986: 924), it was the thousands of “Adolf Eichmanns,” 
with their fierce loyalty to Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime that produced the results seen 
from the Nazi bureaucracy of murder.  However, there had to be more that motivated all of 
these Eichmanns to act with such zeal, especially given the repugnance of their aims, than 
simply a loyalty to Hitler.  That x-factor was, according to Breton and Wintrobe (1986: 924), 
the competitive and entrepreneurial spirit that characterized these “Eichmanns” that was 
required to produce results like those seen between 1941 and May of 1945.  In their 1982 
book on bureaucratic conduct, Breton and Wintrobe develop a non-traditional (modern) 
model of bureaucratic management that is based on the notion of “vertical trust” – the idea 
that subordinates “trade services” that advance the goals of the bureau’s leadership in return 
for various “informal payments,” none of which are codified in formal contracts (given, in 
the case of the Nazi bureaucracy of murder, the repugnance of the “informal services”) 
between the two sets of parties.  Applying the Breton and Wintrobe (1982) model to the 
Nazi bureaucracy, this meant that Nazi functionaries such as Eichmann acted as bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs in accomplishing goals relating to “the Jewish question,” and ultimately “the 
Final Solution,” for their superiors, such as Hitler and Heinrich Himmler (Breton and 
Wintrobe, 1986).       
 
     Although Breton and Wintrobe (1986) focus mainly on Adolf Eichmann's historical role 
in providing Hitler with informal services related to the Final Solution, Mixon, Sawyer and 
Trevino (2004a and 2004b) provide a broader accounting of the activities of other historical 
figures, often paired with evidence of “informal payments” within the Nazi’s vertical trust 
network, that support a wide application of the Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986) model 
of bureaucracy.  In addition to Eichmann, these include Reinhard Heydrich, who headed the 
Reich Security Service (i.e., the SD) at a rank (Sturmbannführer) only two levels above the 
median position in the Nazi hierarchy, and Christian Wirth, who administered the 
construction branch of “Operation Reinhard,” the plan to use death camps at Belzec, 
Sobibor and Treblinka to eradicate the Polish Jews (Mixon et al., 2004: 860-861).  Wirth was, 
at the time (1941), at a rank (Haupsturmführer) only one level above the median position in the 
Nazi apparatus.  According to Mixon et al. (2004), the potential for advancement for each of 
these two functionaries served as a potential “informal payment” that was significant enough 
to motivate each of them to devise creative initiatives and solutions related to “the Jewish 
question.”  That motivation, and the resulting “Schumpeterian entrepreneurship” (Breton 
and Wintrobe, 1986: 909) exhibited by both Heyrdrich and Wirth, led to rates of 
advancement that are difficult to imagine in most bureaucracies.
1  For example, Heydrich 
advanced from a 60
th percentile position (rank) in the Nazi bureaucracy to a 90
th percentile 
position in the period from 1931-1941 (Mixon et al., 2004a: 862-863).  Breton and 
Wintrobe’s (1986) subject, Adolf Eichmann, also advanced at a rapid pace, moving from a 
45
th percentile position (rank) to a 65
th percentile position (rank) over the brief period from 
1938-1941 (Mixon et al., 2004a: 862-863). 
                                                 
1 See also Schumpeter (1934 and 1942).      There is also little argument that such an undertaking – the murder of six million people 
– would require the participation of thousands or more people who were spread all over the 
European continent.  As Mixon et al. (2004a: 863) state, 
  
“It seems reasonable to assume . . . that results concerning the final solution would have been greater in the 
minor axis countries . . . than in the other countries that Germany occupied [militarily] . . . This likely would 
have obtained given that, within the minor axis power countries, the Nazi bureaucracy would have been able to 
rely on local vertical trust networks, in addition to their own vertical trust networks and the coercion of the 
local populations/Jewish Councils (Judenrate).  In the remaining occupied countries . . . only the latter two 
options for effecting the solution to the Jewish question in Europe would have been available.” 
 
Through the quote above Mixon et al. (2004a) offer a compelling economic hypothesis.  
However, given that this particular hypothesis formed only a minor part of their study, the 
empirical analysis of it therein is scant.  The current study more adequately tests the 
bureaucratic institutions hypothesis above.  Upon obtaining results from a linear regression, 
our estimates are decomposed so that a real comparison of coercion and vertical trust can be 
made.  The decomposition technique used here is found in labor market studies that test for 
the presence/absence of gender and/or racial discrimination in wages and other aspects of 
employment.
2  In the following section, these empirical tests, along with their results, are 
more fully developed and presented. 
  
2. The Nazi Bureaucracy of Murder: Coercion vs. Vertical Trust 
Our statistical test of the relative scale of coercion and vertical trust in the Nazi bureaucracy 
of murder begins with the model in equation (1) below, 
 
DEATHNi = α + β1TOTJEWSi + β2VTRUSTi + ε,                                      (1) 
 
where DEATHNi is equal to the number of Jews killed in country i during the Nazi 
Holocaust, TOTJEWSi is equal to the pre-war Jewish population in country i and VTRUSTi 
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if country i is aligned with the major European Axis 
powers during WWII, and zero otherwise.  Also in equation (1) are α, β1, and β2, which are 
parameters to be estimated (by OLS) in the model, while ε is the error term.  One would 
expect that the German-occupied European countries with larger pre-WWII Jewish 
populations experienced higher death totals at the hands of the Nazi bureaucracy, ceteris 
paribus.  Thus, it is expected that β1 will be greater than zero.  If coercion was as effective as 
vertical trust in carrying out the Nazi holocaust, then one would expect that β2 will be equal 
to zero.  However, if there are gains from the kinds of bureaucratic entrepreneurship that are 
fostered in a bureaucratic structure that relies on vertical trust, with its attendant “informal 
payments,” then one would expect that β2 will be greater than zero.  This is so because the 
leaders of the Nazi bureaucracy of murder would have been able to use vertical trust to carry 
out the Holocaust within the borders of partner or minor Axis countries (e.g., Rumania) for 
which VTRUST=1. 
 
     Data on the number of Jews killed in each country, along with the various sizes of the 
pre-WWII Jewish populations for each, come from The Simon Wiesenthal Center.  These are 
                                                 
2 Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) represent the seminal articles on wages decomposition.  As such, the terms 
“Blinder decomposition” and “Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition” are often applied to the statistical exercise. 
   used in conjunction with the map of pre-WWII Europe shown in the Appendix (Pearcy and 
Dickson, 1996) to code VTRUSTi for the various European countries.  By the eve of WWII 
(i.e., August 31, 1939), Germany had annexed Austria to its south and the part of 
Czechoslovakia that is today known as the Czech Republic to its southeast.  As such, these 
areas are considered part of Germany and the major European Axis powers (i.e., Germany 
and Italy) for the purposes of this study.   The minor Axis powers used in this study are 
Hungary and Rumania, both of which lie to the southeast of Germany.
3  These countries, 
along with the Axis-occupied countries from the Appendix, are listed in their respective 
categories in Table 1.
4 
Table 1 
















Soviet Union  
Yugoslavia  
 
     Estimation results for equation (1) are shown below in equation (2), with t-statistics in 
parentheses: 
 
DEATHN = 19,443 + 0.360[TOTJEWS] + 150,768[VTRUST]             (2) 
                       (1.2)      (19.3)                           (3.7) 
 
                    F-stat=212.8      R2=0.973 
Not only are the regressors in (2) above jointly significant (i.e., F-stat=213) for explaining 
DEATHN, the model explains almost all of the variation (i.e., R
2=0.97) in DEATHN across 
the European countries.  As expected, both β1 and β2 are greater than zero, and statistically so 
in both cases.  In fact, the equation (2) results suggest that, ceteris paribus, the number of Jews 
killed in the minor Axis powers exceeded that in the occupied European countries by more 
                                                 
3 We omitted countries reporting fewer than 50 Jews killed as part of the Holocaust.  This precluded the use of 
Bulgaria and Finland, each of which reported fewer than 10 deaths.  
4 The death camps at Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmo, Majdanek, Sobibor and Treblinka are generally regarded as 
the most well-known of the Nazi death camps.  Each of these was located in Poland.  Because so much of the 
killing during the Holocaust occurred within the borders of Poland, and particularly within these camps, the 
lack of the need for transcontinental transportation, etc. made it easier for the Nazis to apply the Holocaust 
apparatus to the Polish Jews.  Therefore, we omitted Poland from our empirical analysis.  However, looking 
ahead our results are not sensitive to inclusion of Poland as a categorical variable for the importance of its 
death camps to the Nazi bureaucracy. 
   than 150,000.
5  However, the dummy variable approach offered by equation (1) above is not 
adequate in explaining whether or not the additional deaths from within the minor Axis 
powers is due to their status as minor Axis powers.  Thus, the approach in equation (1) is 
not capable of parsing the coercion vs. vertical trust hypothesis developed in Mixon et al. 
(2004a), and re-stated above in the instant study. 
 
     To adequately parse the coercion vs. vertical trust hypothesis, the results in equation (2) 
are decomposed.  This is done by comparing the difference in the mean of DEATHN across 
the minor Axis countries and the occupied countries with the difference in the means of 
DEATHN in these two sets of countries assuming they had been classified or treated the 
same way (e.g., as occupied countries) by the Germans.  First, the difference in the actual 
means, also known as the total effect, is equal to 295,170, in favor of the minor Axis powers.  
This effect is shown in Table 2.  Also included in Table 2 is the endowment effect, which 
represents how DEATHN would have differed across the two sets of countries in Table 1 
had both sets existed (during WWII) as occupied countries.  This effect is found using the 
results of a regression of DEATHN on TOTJEW using only the data for the occupied 
countries.  The mean values of TOTJEW for the occupied countries, and that for the minor 
AXIS powers, are separately applied to this regression in order to calculate the endowment 
effect.  As Table 2 indicates, the endowment effect is equal to 143,380, and favors the minor 
Axis powers.  The endowment effect indicates that DEATHN in the minor Axis powers is 
predicted have exceeded that in the occupied countries even if the minor Axis powers would 
have had to have been occupied by Germany in order to induce their cooperation in the 
Nazi Holocaust.  However, as a comparison between the total effect and the endowment 
effect shows (see Table 2), the total effect is much larger than the endowment effect.  The 
difference between the two, almost 152,000, is known as the residual effect or residual difference, 
and it represents that portion of the total effect that can be attributed to the minor Axis 
powers’ status as minor Axis powers.  That is, the residual effect, with its positive sign, 
represents the gains in scale that can be attributed to the Nazis’ use of vertical trust, as 




Total Effect Endowment Effect Residual Effect 
295,170 143,380  151,790 
[F2,11 = 25.65]
 
     To complete our statistical analysis, we treat the residual effect above as stochastic.  To 
conduct a test of significance on this component of the total effect, DEATHN is regressed 
on TOTJEW, VTRUST and [TOTJEW • VTRUST] using the pooled data set, where the 
interaction term (i.e., [TOTJEW • VTRUST]) represents the difference in the country-
classification estimates of the regressor TOTJEW.  The significance test used here is the 
traditional F-test for the significance of the last M coefficients in the model (i.e., [TOTJEW • 
VTRUST]) and VTRUST, the vertical trust/coercion dummy (Jackson and Lindley, 1989).  
The resulting F-statistic is equal to 25.65 (with 2,11 degrees of freedom), which is highly 
significant.  This result indicates that the residual effect, which itself represents more than 51 
                                                 
5 A version of equation (1) that also includes JEWOFPOP, or the Jewish percentage of each country’s 1939 
overall population (excluding Slovakia) was also tested.  In that case, all three regressors are positive and 
statistically significant, and they account for 99 percent of the variation in DEATHN. 
   percent of the total effect in death counts across the two sets of European countries in Table 
1 (in favor of the minor Axis powers), is an important factor in explaining differences in the 
scale of the Nazi Holocaust apparatus across the European continent. 
  
3. Concluding Comments  
Given what the Nazis accomplished through the Final Solution – a result that would not 
have been predicted by the traditional model of bureaucracy – it is important that scholars 
continue to focus on refining that model, as Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986) and 
Mixon et al. (2004a) have done.  As the first study to focus on the issue through extensive 
empirical testing, this study has further, and uniquely, shown how widely applicable the 
Breton-Wintrobe (modern) model of bureaucracy is in explaining the horrific and criminal 
acts committed by the Nazis during the Holocaust.  Our statistical results above indicate 
that, through the use of vertical trust networks, and with their attendant informal payments, 
a spirit of bureaucratic or Schumpeterian entrepreneurship was harnessed within the Nazi 
Holocaust bureaucracy functionaries in places like Hungary and Rumania that was similar to 
that seen in well-known historical figures from Germany, such as Adolf Eichmann.   
Through its vast size and scope, the Nazi Holocaust apparatus is unlike any other 
bureaucracy in history.  It is because of this uniqueness that the Breton-Wintrobe (modern) 
model of bureaucracy is likely to be adaptable in ways that aid in our understanding of the 
more quintessential bureaucracy.        
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